The Acquisitions of the Chinese State-Owned Enterprises under the National Merger Control Regimes of the EU Member States: Searching for a Coherent Approach by Svetlicinii, Alexandr
99
Market and Competition Law Review / volume ii / no. 1 / april 2018
The acquisitions of the Chinese State-owned Enterprises 
under the National Merger Control regimes of the EU 
Member States: Searching for a Coherent approach*
Alexandr Svetlicinii**
aBStraCt: With the rapidly unfolding China’s Belt and road initiative (Bri) and the 
ongoing reform of the State-owned enterprises (SoEs), the number of overseas acquisi-
tions by the Chinese SoEs in various industrial and services sectors is gradually on the 
rise. These transactions have raised a number of questions in terms of the assessment of 
the economic concentrations’ potential impact on competition and challenged the tradi-
tional assessment tools employed by the merger control regimes. The paper examines the 
evolving experience of Chinese SoEs’ acquisitions in the European Union (EU), which 
are subject to ex ante assessment under both EU and national merger control regimes. 
The analysis of the merger assessment practice of the EU Commission culminating in the 
recent conditional approval of the ChemChina/Syngenta merger indicates that the tradi-
tional assessment tools, when applied to the acquisitions by Chinese SoEs, may no longer 
be adequate to grasp the essence of their corporate governance and decision-making. 
The review of the merger control practice of the national competition authorities (NCas) 
also demonstrates the absence of a coherent assessment approach to the cases involving 
Chinese SoEs, which may lead to the inconsistent enforcement and strengthening of the 
foreign investment screening on grounds other than market competition. 
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Introduction
The Belt and road initiative (Bri) officially unveiled in 20131 and labelled 
by the commentators as “globalization with Chinese characteristics”2 pro-
vided for USd 900 billion worth of planned investments in infrastructure 
across Central and South asia, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE).3 The pursuit of the Bri objectives was embedded into the 
Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), revised at the 19th 
National Congress of the CCP in october 2017.4 The action Plan on Bri 
released in 2015 calls for the improvement of the investment, trade facilita-
tion and removal of the recurrent investment and trade barriers.5 
The leading role in the Bri is expected to be played by the State-owned 
enterprises (SoEs).6 in the words of the Chinese Premier li Keqiang, 
“Chinese SoE’s participation in global cooperation on production capac-
ity, especially through the newly introduced Silk road Economic Belt and 
the 21st Century Maritime Silk road, will benefit not only the Chinese 
economy but also other economies”.7 The Guiding opinions of the State 
Council on outbound investment highlighted the following types of out-
bound investment by Chinese enterprises, which are encouraged and 
1 See Ministry of Foreign affairs of the People’s republic of China, “President Xi Jinping deliv-
ers important speech and proposes to build a silk road economic belt with Central asian coun-
tries”, 7 September 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfh-
shzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml.
2 See e.g. Jason Zukus, “Globalization with Chinese characteristics: a new international stand-
ard?”, The Diplomat, 9 May 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/globalization-with-chinese-
characteristics-a-new-international-standard/.
3 See The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, “a road to riches or a road to ruin? The geo-economic 
implications of China’s new silk road”, 15 august 2017, https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/
reports/Geoeconomics_Behind_oBor_FiNal%20%283%29.pdf, 3. The financial support for 
the Bri projects will be provided by the asian infrastructure development Bank (with USd 100 
billion in authorised capital), the New development (BriCS) Bank, the New Silk road Fund (with 
USd 40 billion capital), investment Cooperation Fund between China and Central and Eastern 
European countries (USd 3 billion), etc.
4 Constitution of the Communist Party of China (revised and adopted at the 19th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China on 24 october 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-
lish/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf. 
5 State Council of the People’s republic of China, “Full text: action plan on the Belt and 
road initiative”, 30 March 2015, http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/con-
tent_281475080249035.htm. 
6 For the discussion on the typology of Chinese SoEs see Sheng Hong and Zhao Nong, China’s 
State-Owned Enterprises: Nature, Performance and Reform (World Scientific, 2013), 35-44.
7 Xing Zhigang, “li calls on SoEs to keep ‘going global’”, China Daily, 21 September 2015, http://
europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-09/21/content_21931678.htm. 
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supported by the State: (1) outbound investment in infrastructure that 
is conducive to the Bri, and connects infrastructure in surrounding 
regions; (2) outbound investment that drives the export of domestic supe-
rior production capacity, high-quality equipment and applicable technol-
ogy; (3) investment cooperation with overseas high-tech and advanced 
manufacturing enterprises.8 The major Chinese SoEs including China 
Communications Construction, China State Construction Engineering, 
PowerChina, Sinomach, China railway Construction Corporation, China 
railway Group, China National Petroleum Corporation, and State Grid 
have already participated in nearly 1,700 projects along the Bri economic 
corridors.9 
another important economic policy that directed Chinese SoEs towards 
the acquisition of foreign technologies, know-how, and brands is “Made in 
China 2025”. it aims at the modernization of the Chinese manufactur-
ing sector through the gradual replacement of the foreign technologies 
with Chinese ones in the domestic market and the increased presence of 
Chinese high-tech companies on international markets.10 in the words of 
the Chinese President Xi Jinping: “We will move Chinese industries up 
to the medium-high end of the global value chain, and foster a number 
of world-class advanced manufacturing clusters”.11 The above mentioned 
economic policies have led to an unprecedented increase in Fdi flows from 
China to the EU. according to the report by Mercator institute for China 
Studies, in 2016 alone the Chinese Fdi in the EU saw a 77% increase com-
pared to 2015.12
8 Guiding opinions on Further Guiding and regulating the directions of outbound investment, 
4 august 2017, paragraph 3.
9 See Baker McKenzie and Silk road associates, “Belt & road: opportunity and risk”, october 2017, 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/10/chinas-belt-road-initiative/, 8.
10 See e.g. Mercator institute for China Studies, “Made in China 2025: The making of a high-tech 
superpower and consequences for the industrial countries”, december 2016, https://www.merics.
org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/MPoC/MPoC_Made_in_China_2025/MPoC_No.2_
MadeinChina_2025.pdf. 
11 Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects 
and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” (delivered 
at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 october 2017), http://www.xin-
huanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf, 26.
12 Mercator institute for China Studies, “record flows and growing imbalances: Chinese invest-
ment in Europe in 2016”, January 2017, https://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user_upload/down-
loads/MPoC/CoFdi_2017/MPoC_03_Update_CoFdi_Web.pdf. 
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due to the size of the Chinese “national champions”, the bulk of their 
acquisitions in the EU has undergone screening by the EU Commission 
under the EU merger control rules. With the exception of the ChemChina/
Syngenta transaction,13 which was subjected to a number of remedies,14 
other cases involving Chinese SoEs have been cleared unconditionally. 
These cases have attracted a certain degree of scrutiny by legal scholars15 
and practitioners16 pointing out the challenges posed by these transac-
tions for the application of the EU merger control rules, more specifically 
the assessment of State control over SoEs for the purpose of identifying 
the “single economic unit”. at the same time, little attention has been 
accorded to the application of the national merger control rules in the 
Member States where the notified transactions did not reach the “com-
munity dimension” under the EU Merger regulation,17 especially given 
the fact that national merger rules generally follow the EU standards and 
use similar legal concepts.18 
The present paper provides an overview of the merger control enforce-
ment involving the Chinese SoEs at the level of the EU Member States 
and their national competition authorities (NCas). it commences with the 
review of the EU merger rules applicable to the economic concentrations 
13 Case No. CoMP/M.7962 ChemChina/Syngenta, decision of 5 april 2017.
14 See European Commission, press release iP/17/882 “Mergers: Commission clears ChemChina 
acquisition of Syngenta, subject to conditions”, 5 april 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
iP-17-882_en.htm. 
15 See e.g. alan riley, “Nuking misconceptions: Hinkley Point, Chinese SoEs and EU merger 
law”, European Competition Law Review 37, no. 8 (2016): 301-324; odd Stemsrud, “‘China inc.’ 
under Merger regulation review: the Commission’s approach to acquisitions by Chinese public 
undertakings”, European Competition Law Review 32, no. 10 (2011): 481-487; Piet Jan Slot, “The 
application of the EU merger control rules to State owned enterprises”, European Competition Law 
Review 36, no. 11 (2015): 484-492; alexandr Svetlicinii, “The acquisitions of the Chinese State-
owned enterprises under the EU merger control regime: time for reflection?”, Revue Lamy de la 
Concurrence 67 (2017): 30-36.
16 See e.g. adrian Emch, “EU merger control complications for Chinese SoE transactions”, 
Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 27 May 2016, http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.
com/2016/05/27/eu-merger-control-complications-for-chinese-soe-transactions/; Fountoukakos 
Kyriakos and Camille Puech-Baron, “The EU merger regulation and transactions involving states 
or state-owned enterprises: applying rules designed for the EU to the People’s republic of China”, 
Concurrences 1 (2012): 44-54.
17 Council regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, oJ l 24.
18 See liza Bellulo, Gwenaëlle Nouët, “Merger control in the EU and in the 27 Member States: 
towards voluntary procedural and substantial convergence?”, Concurrences Review 2 (2011): 
55-65.
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involving SoEs that were interpreted and applied in the EU Commission’s 
merger control enforcement. The discussion then proceeds to the analysis 
of the national merger control rules and their application by the NCas of 
the EU Member States in cases involving Chinese SoEs. The discussion is 
concluded with a summary of the challenges presented by the recent wave 
of acquisitions led by the Chinese SoEs and the articulation of the need for 
a more consistent approach in merger assessment at both EU and national 
levels. 
EU merger control and the State-owned enterprises
The EU Merger regulation and the Commission’s Jurisdictional Notice19 
set the legal framework for application of the EU merger control, which is 
based on the general principle of non-discrimination between the public 
and the private sectors.20The determination of whether a merger between 
two SoEs constitutes economic concentration for the purpose of the EU 
Merger regulation is based on the concept of “single economic unit” or 
“single economic entity”, which encompasses all undertakings under the 
single center of decision-making. Therefore, a merger between two under-
takings owned by the same State will constitute concentration under the 
EU Merger regulation if the undertakings concerned are part of different 
economic units having an independent power of decision.21
The EU Commission has established the existence of a single decision-
making center in cases where the controlling entity is able to influence the 
following decisions of the target undertaking: decisions on the appoint-
ment of the management; decisions on the adoption of financial plans; 
decisions on the adoption of business plans; decisions concerning invest-
ments; decisions concerning the choice of technology; and decisions con-
cerning product development.22 in the case of SoEs, the Jurisdictional 
19 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01), oJ C 95.
20 EU Merger regulation, recital 22.
21 Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 153. as explained by the EU Commission in Neste/Ivo case, 
“The companies can be considered to be independent undertakings (…) if they are given the power 
to implement independently their respective commercial conduct on the market and their com-
mercial policy”. Case iV/M.931 Neste/Ivo, decision of 2 June 1998, paragraph 7.
22 See Morten Broberg, “The concept of control in the Merger Control regulation”, European 
Competition Law Review 25, no. 12 (2004): 741-751, 743. For example, in Rosneft/TNK-BP case the 
EU Commission established a “single economic unit” including all russian SoEs in the oil and gas 
industry taking into account the following factors: (1) the members of the board of directors are 
appointed and removed by the controlling shareholder, which is the russian State; (2) the members 
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Notice clearly distinguishes between the powers exercised by the State as 
a public authority and its powers as a controlling shareholder exercised 
over the SoE.23 The regulatory powers of the State exercised in the pub-
lic interest are not regarded as control within the EU Merger regulation. 
according to the Jurisdictional Notice, “where a State-owned company is 
not subject to any coordination with other State-controlled holdings, it 
should be treated as independent”.24
The identification of the “single economic unit” in the case of SoEs con-
trolled by the same State is also necessary for the calculation of the rel-
evant turnover in order to ascertain whether the concentration reaches 
the “Community dimension” and therefore the EU Commission must be 
notified. The EU Merger regulation applies the following methodology for 
the calculation of the relevant turnover of the SoEs: “in the public sector, 
calculation of the turnover of an undertaking concerned in a concentra-
tion needs, therefore, to take account of undertakings making up an eco-
nomic unit with an independent power of decision, irrespective of the way 
in which their capital is held or of the rules of administrative supervision 
applicable to them”.25
EU Commission’s assessment of mergers involving Chinese  
State-owned enterprises
The above mentioned methodology for the identification of the “single 
economic unit” in cases concerning undertakings owned by the same 
State was tested in several recent cases involving the Chinese SoEs. 
Bluestar/Elkem merger26 was among such cases where the EU Commission 
of the current board of directors were concurrently members of other russian SoEs (interlocking 
directorships); (3) the State-nominated members of the board of directors were required by law 
to cast their vote in accordance with any directives issued by the russian Government. Case No. 
CoMP/M.6801 Rosneft/TNK-BP, decision of 8 March 2013, paragraph 7.
23 Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 53: “the prerogatives exercised by a State acting as a public 
authority rather than as a shareholder, in so far as they are limited to the protection of the public 
interest, do not constitute control within the meaning of the Merger regulation to the extent that 
they have neither the aim nor the effect of enabling the State to exercise a decisive influence over 
the activity of the undertaking”. See also Judgment of 12 december 2012, Electrabel v. Commission, 
t-332/09, EU:t:2012:672, paragraphs 86-126.
24 Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 194.
25 EU Merger regulation, recital 22. See also Case CoMP/M.6812 SFPI/Dexia, decision of 21 
February 2013, paragraphs 1-23; Case CoMP/M.5508 SoFFin/Hypo Real Estate, decision of 14 May 
2009, paragraphs 5, 6, 24, and 25.
26 Case No. CoMP/M.6082 China National Bluestar/Elkem, decision of 31 March 2011.
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examined the acquisition of the Norwegian company by China National 
Bluestar Group, an SoE wholly owned by the Chinese State and controlled 
by the State-owned assets Supervision and administration Commission 
of the State Council (SaSaC), “probably the most important organization 
in the world that nobody has ever heard of”.27 in its press release announc-
ing the clearance of the specified merger the EU Commission emphasised 
that “the assessment of the links between Chinese State-owned companies 
in the same sector relied on the same criteria as those applied for assess-
ing mergers involving European State-owned companies”.28 Nevertheless, 
the EU Commission’s decision does not provide a definite answer as to 
the ultimate decision-making center of the Chinese SoEs involved in the 
merger. one of the problems identified by the legal practitioners in the 
aftermath of the case was the apparent lack of substantive information 
from the SoEs, SaSaC, and the Chinese State that would allow the EU 
Commission to carry out an in-depth assessment of the likelihood of vari-
ous foreclosure scenarios and coordination among SoEs.29
in DSM/Sinochem case the parties submitted that Sinochem was a sep-
arate economic entity with independent power of decision because the 
applicable legislation prevented SaSaC from intervening in the strategic 
decision-making process of this SoE.30 The EU Commission referred to 
the oECd report31 on China’s regulatory reform stating that the govern-
ment can influence the commercial decision-making of the SoEs through 
a number of channels. Nevertheless, in the absence of representation by 
the Chinese State and accompanying evidence, the EU Commission was 
27 Barry Naughton, “The transformation of the State sector: SaSaC, the market economy, and the 
new national champions”, in State Capitalism, Institutional Adaptation, and the Chinese Miracle, 
ed. Barry Naughton and Kellee S. tsai (Cambridge, 2015), 46.
28 EU Commission, press release iP/11/394 “Mergers: Commission clears acquisition of the 
Norwegian company Elkem by China National Bluestar”, 1 april 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_iP-11-394_en.htm. 
29 See Frederic depoortere, “The EU Commission clears in phase i a merger in the silicon sec-
tor examining possible coordination by the Chinese State of market behaviour of Chinese State-
owned companies (China National Bluestar/Elkem)” e-Competitions Bulletin 2011, art. no. 38917. 
30 Case No. CoMP/M.6113 DSM/Sinochem/JV, decision of 19 May 2011. See also Porter Elliott, 
“The EU Commission clears a joint venture in the pharmaceutical sector, after examining pos-
sible coordination between Chinese State-owned companies (dSM / Sinochem)”, e-Competitions 
Bulletin 2011, art. no. 41113.
31 oECd, “oECd reviews of regulatory reform: China 2009: defining the boundary between the 
market and the State”, 5 May 2009, http://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-reviews-of-regulatory-
reform-china-2009-9789264059429-en.htm.
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unable to reach a definite conclusion whether Sinochem enjoys an inde-
pendent power of decision”.32 The same approach has been followed by 
the EU Commission in a number of subsequent merger cases including 
CNAC/Koor Industries,33 PetroChina/Ineos,34 CNRC/Pirelli,35 Mercuria/
Sinomart,36 and CNCE/KM Group.37
a turning point for the assessment of the Chinse SoEs’ acquisitions 
under the EU merger control rules was reached in EDF/CGN/NNB case38 
involving China General Nuclear Power Corporation, Electricité de 
France, and NNB Holding Company operating nuclear power plants in 
the United Kingdom. in its assessment the EU Commission found that 
SaSaC had an influence on the decision-making of CGN and, there-
fore, the latter cannot be considered an autonomous decision-making 
center.39 due to the Chinese State’s ability to coordinate the conduct of 
the SoEs in the energy sector and in the nuclear industry in particular, 
all SoEs in the energy sector controlled by the central SaSaC should 
be viewed as a single economic unit for the purpose of the EU Merger 
regulation.40 Some authors argued that the EU Commission’s decision 
in this case signaled that the “narrow SoE group” approach is no lon-
ger tenable for jurisdictional assessments under the EU merger con-
trol.41 others argued that the Commission’s approach “is unnecessarily 
broad and fails to adequately understand the competitive landscape in 
the energy sector”.42 at the same time, in relation to the EDF/CGN/NNB 
case, it remained unclear whether the above conclusions apply to sec-
tors other than energy and whether all SoEs controlled by the central 
32 CoMP/M.6113, paragraph 16.
33 Case No. CoMP/M.6141 China National Agrochemical Corporation/Koor Industries/
Makhteshim Agan Industries, decision of 3 october 2011.
34 Case No. CoMP/M.6151 PetroChina/Ineos/JV, decision of 13 May 2011.
35 Case No. CoMP/M.7643 CNRC/Pirelli, decision of 1 July 2015.
36 Case No. CoMP/M.6807 Mercuria Energy Asset Management/Sinomart KTS Development/
Vesta Terminals, decision of 7 March 2013.
37 Case No. CoMP/M.7911 CNCE/KM Group, decision of 15 March 2016.
38 Case No. CoMP/M.7850 EDF/CGN/NNB, decision of 10 March 2016.
39 CoMP/M.7850, paragraph 37.
40 CoMP/M.7850, paragraph 49.
41 See alan riley, “Nuking misconceptions: Hinkley Point, Chinese SoEs and EU merger law”, 
European Competition Law Review 37, no. 8, 2016: 301-324, 324.
42 angela Huyue Zhang, “The antitrust paradox of China inc.”, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 50, 2017: 159-226, 198.
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SaSaC constitute a single economic unit.43 The approach followed by the 
EU Commission in this case did not become a norm and the subsequent 
ChemChina/Syngenta merger was analysed under the “worst case” sce-
nario without reaching a definite conclusion concerning the autonomy of 
ChemChina from the central SaSaC.44
as a result, the EU Commission’s application of the non-discriminatory 
treatment of public undertakings under the EU Merger regulation in the 
cases concerning acquisitions by the Chinese SoEs has raised a number 
of questions, which have been largely left unanswered: (1) would a con-
centration between Chinese SoEs constitute a concentration or internal 
reorganization under the EU Merger regulation?; (2) what is the composi-
tion of the “single economic unit” which should be taken into account for 
the calculation of the relevant turnover when determining the existence 
of “Community dimension”?; (3) does the State control over SoEs, exer-
cised through SaSaC, translate into the influence and coordination of the 
SoEs’ commercial conduct in particular sectors?
The indecisive stance on the above mentioned issues stands in stark 
contrast to the resolute conclusions reached by the EU Commission in 
its recent report on market distortions in the Chinese economy,45 which 
stipulates that by having party cells in 90% of all SoEs, the party commit-
tees “can potentially wield significant influence, and allow for the CCP to 
directly influence the business decisions of individual companies”.46 The 
report concludes that the competence of CCP “extends to the level of busi-
ness decisions of individual enterprises”47 and that “the applicable laws 
43 See tanisha a. James and M. Howard Morse, “regulatory hurdles facing mergers with Chinese 
State-owned enterprises in the United States and the European Union”, China Antitrust Law 
Journal 1, no. 1 (2017): 1-24.
44 Case No. CoMP/M.7962 ChemChina/Syngenta, decision of 5 april 2017. See the EU Commission 
press release iP/17/882 “Mergers: Commission clears ChemChina acquisition of Syngenta, subject 
to conditions”, 5 april 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_iP-17-882_en.htm.
45 EU Commission press release “The EU’s new trade defence rules and first country report”, 20 
december 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMo-17-5377_en.htm. 
46 Commission Staff Working document on Significant distortions in the Economy of the People’s 
republic of China for the Purposes of trade defence investigations, SWd(2017) 483 final/2, 20 
december 2017, 26. The report highlights the existence of the two structures in the corporate 
governance of the Chinese SoEs: legal governance (as prescribed by company laws) and political 
governance (as prescribed by the CCP organizational rules). See also Jiangyu Wang, “The politi-
cal logic of corporate governance in China’s State-owned enterprises”, Cornell International Law 
Journal 47, 2014: 631-669.
47 Ibid., 39.
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confer upon the Government significant powers which allow it to effec-
tively control SoEs, be it via dedicated supervision bodies – SaSaC and 
local SaSaCs, be it by directly participating in the operational decision-
making of SoEs”.48 More specifically, in relation to the chemical industry 
analysed in several merger cases, the EU Commission concluded that the 
Chinese State “aims at restructuring the chemicals market once again by 
directly intervening into corporate decision-making and impacting supply 
and demand, thus distorting the market in various chemical sub-sectors 
through a plethora of measures”.49
Nevertheless, without clear guidance from the EU Commission, the 
NCas of the Member States have been confronted with the same chal-
lenges in merger assessment as many acquisitions of the Chinese SoEs 
did not reach the “Community dimension” and were notified under the 
national merger rules. The following sections summarise the study of the 
national merger control rules and their enforcement in the selected EU 
Member States and countries aspiring for EU membership.
State-owned enterprises in national merger regulations
our study reviewed the national merger control rules in the 28 EU Member 
States with regard to their application to concentrations involving SoEs. 
The review of the national regulatory frameworks in this domain allows 
for the identification of three broader groups. The majority of Member 
States do not have any specific rules on SoEs in their merger control leg-
islation. a far less numerous group of countries have provided for spe-
cific SoE-related rules or guidelines. Finally, the third group of Member 
States, which overlaps with the first two, enforces sector-specific merger 
regulations.
For example, denmark has adopted several SoE-specific provisions 
related to the calculation of the relevant turnover.50 For the calculation of 
turnover for central authorities, the turnover is replaced by the aggregate 
gross operational expenditure in the preceding accounting year of the min-
isterial province concerned and in the central government accounts.51 For 
48 Ibid., 108.
49 Ibid., 434.
50 Executive order No. 808 of 14 august 2009 on the Calculation of turnover in the Competition 
act, https://www.en.kfst.dk/media/1366/executive-order-on-the-calculation-of-turnover-in-the-
competition-act.pdf. 
51 Executive order No. 808, paragraph 9(1).
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a municipal or regional authority, the turnover is replaced by the aggregate 
gross operational and investment expenditure in the preceding account-
ing year.52 For the determination of ownership and control, the danish 
Competition and Consumer authority refers to the EU Commission’s 
Jurisdictional Notice.53
in France, the competition authority’s merger guidelines refer to recital 
22 of the EU Merger regulation, which confirms the principle of non-dis-
crimination between public and private sector. it further stipulates that the 
State as such cannot be considered as an undertaking and, therefore, when 
calculating the turnover of the SoEs, the competition authority will only 
consider the undertakings that belong to a “single economic unit” with 
autonomous decision-making power.54 as a result, if a target undertaking is 
acquired by an SoE, the following factors can be considered for the purpose 
of the turnover calculation: (1) to question whether the target company will 
have, after the operation, an autonomous power of decision (in the case of 
a positive response the transaction does not constitute a concentration); (2) 
if the target company does not constitute a “single economic unit” with 
autonomous decision-making power, it is necessary to determine what the 
ultimate “acquiring entity” will be, which together with the target company 
will constitute a “single economic unit”; (3) to determine which undertak-
ing controlled by this “acquiring entity” should be taken into account when 
calculating the turnover.55 Generally, these provisions follow the layout 
of the EU Commission’s Jurisdictional Notice.56 When determining the 
existence of the autonomous power of decision, Autorité de la concurrence 
can take into account various factors such as the corporate governance 
of the respective SoEs, the mode of exercising State control, the presence 
52 Executive order No. 808, paragraph 9(2).
53 The Competition and Consumer authority’s Guidelines to Executive order No. 808 of 14 august 
2009 on the Calculation of turnover in the Competition act, February 2014, 13, https://www.
en.kfst.dk/media/3304/feb-2014-guidelines-to-the-executive-order-on-notification-of-mergers-
and-on-merger-fees.pdf. 
54 Lignes directrices de l’Autorité de la concurrence relatives au contrôle des concentrations, 10 July 
2013, paragraph 108.
55 Lignes directrices de l’Autorité de la concurrence relatives au contrôle des concentrations, 10 July 
2013, paragraph 109.
56 Jurisdictional Notice, paragraphs 153, 194-196. Similarly, in Slovakia, the NCa’s guidelines on 
turnover calculation refer to the Jurisdictional Notice when discussing the calculation of turno-
ver of SoEs. See Guidelines of the anti-Monopoly office on Calculation of turnover (in Slovak), 
http://www.antimon.gov.sk/data/files/387_usmernenie-protimonopolneho-uradu-slovenskej-
republiky-k-vypoctu-obratu.pdf, paragraph 28.
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of interlocking directorships, the rules on the circulation of commercial 
information among the SoEs concerned, etc.57 
The Hungarian Competition act provides that “the undertakings…in 
majority state or municipal ownership and with autonomous decision-
making powers in determining their market conduct shall be deemed to 
be independent of each other”.58 When defining the rules for the calcula-
tion of the turnover, the competition law also refers to the concept of “eco-
nomic unit”, which includes undertakings in State ownership with auton-
omous decision-making powers in determining their market conduct.59
Similarly, the Czech NCa’s guidelines on the turnover calculations spec-
ify that “the turnover of a state-controlled undertaking does not comprise 
the turnover of all companies that are directly or indirectly controlled by 
the state, but only those which form part of the same business entity”.60 For 
example, if the State-owned shares are concentrated in holding companies, 
or they are jointly controlled, or it is clear for other reasons that SoEs form 
a “business entity with independent power to take decisions”, the NCa 
would consider such undertakings a part of the merging parties for the 
purpose of turnover calculation. The Czech NCa’s guidelines are notable 
because they explicitly state that mergers and acquisitions involving two 
or more SoEs controlled by the same State should be considered a concen-
tration “on condition that the merging parties have been in the long term 
acting in the market as independent economic entities”.61 in such cases, 
the concentration can be notified by the controlling State acting through 
the ministries and other administrative authorities, or by the undertaking 
with public authority powers.62
57 Lignes directrices de l’Autorité de la concurrence relatives au contrôle des concentrations, 10 July 
2013), paragraph 110. The reliance on these company law mechanisms when assessing the corpo-
rate governance of the Chinese SoEs has been criticised for ignoring other State control mecha-
nisms such as party-led appointments of company executives. See roman tomasic, “Company law 
implementation in the PrC: The rule of law in the shadow of the State”, Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 15, no. 2, 2015: 285-309.
58 act lVii of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and restrictive Market Practices, article 15(3).
59 act lVii of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and restrictive Market Practices, article 27(3). 
60 Notice of the office for the Protection of Competition on Calculation of turnover for the 
Purpose of the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, https://www.uohs.cz/en/com-
petition/decisions-guidelines-and-other-documents.html, paragraph 42.
61 Notice of the office for the Protection of Competition on the Notion of ‘Undertakings 
Concerned’ under the act on Protection of Competition, paragraph 41. 
62 Notice of the office for the Protection of Competition on the Notion of ‘Undertakings 
Concerned’ under the act on Protection of Competition, paragraph 42.
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in Estonia the turnover calculation guidelines adopted by the Minister 
of Economic affairs and Communications stipulate that if an undertaking 
is controlled by the State or a local government, such undertaking shall 
not be deemed to be related through control to other SoEs.63 However, 
if SoEs are jointly managed by a holding company established for such a 
purpose or their economic activities are coordinated, the turnovers of such 
undertakings should be added together for the purpose of establishing the 
application of the national merger control rules.
in Poland the merger guidelines of the Polish NCa – the office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection (Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i 
Konsumentów or UOKiK) stipulates that the undertakings directly con-
trolled by the Ministry of treasury do not form one capital group and 
therefore are subject to notification and approval by the NCa. When, how-
ever, such SoEs create their own capital groups, the concentrations imple-
mented within those groups are exempted from the obligation to notify 
the intention of concentration.64 The capital group is essentially equal to a 
“single economic entity” and is understood as all undertakings controlled 
directly or indirectly by one undertaking, including that undertaking.65
The above review of the national merger control rules indicates that the 
EU Member States have accorded relatively little attention in their merger 
control legislation to the assessment of the concentrations involving SoEs. 
For the most part, the national merger control rules and NCas’ guide-
lines do not contain any SoE-specific provisions or merely refer to the EU 
merger control standards laid down in the EU Merger regulation and the 
EU Commission’s Jurisdictional Notice. Even without such references, the 
national merger rules generally follow the concept of a “single economic 
unit” when appraising transactions involving SoEs in terms of the rele-
vant turnover, autonomy in decision-making and (anti)competitive effects. 
Thus, with little guidance from the EU Commission and the absence of 
63 Guidelines for Calculation of turnover of Parties to Concentration, passed on 22 december 
2010, in force from 1 January 2011, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/MKM/reg/522042016004/
consolide, paragraph 19.
64 Guidelines on the Criteria and Procedure of Notifying the intention of Concentration to the 
President of UoKiK (UoKiK, 2010), https://uokik.gov.pl/merger_control.php, 9. Concentrations 
involving local government units, i.e. commune, poviat and voivodeship of the local govern-
ment, are also subject to the notification. See also Mateusz Blachucki, Polish Competition Law 
– Commentary, Case Law and Texts (UoKiK, 2013), 45-53.
65 Guidelines on the Criteria and Procedure of Notifying the intention of Concentration to the 
President of UoKiK, 20.
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the detailed national rules and guidelines on the matter, the NCas were 
expected to further develop the EU Commission’s methodology or to 
formulate their own approaches to the assessment of the concentrations 
involving Chinese SoEs. The following section analyses the NCas’ merger 
control experience in this domain.
National Competition Authorities and mergers involving Chinese 
State-owned enterprises
The review of the decisions published by the NCas of the EU Member 
States indicates that despite its significance for the substantive assess-
ment and procedural aspects of merger control, the State ownership of 
the Chinese SoEs is often not considered. For example, in 2013 the Hong 
Kong-based China Merchants Holdings (international) Co ltd (China 
Merchants) sought to acquire 49% of the share capital and voting rights 
of the company terminal link SaS, which owns 15 container terminals 
in 8 countries across four major continents and was previously controlled 
by CMa CGM S.a., a French container transportation and shipping com-
pany. The transaction was reviewed by the Commission for the Protection 
of Competition of Cyprus. although the Cypriot NCa noted that China 
Merchants “is considered an important investor and operator of ports 
in China and one of the largest operators of public ports in China, hold-
ing shares in fifteen terminals companies”, the NCa’s decision describes 
China Merchants as a mere “public company, listed on the Hong Kong 
stock exchange”.66 although on its official website, the China Merchants 
Group, the parent company of China Merchants, states that it “is a leading 
state-owned conglomerate based in Hong Kong, under direct supervision 
of SaSaC of the State Council”,67 the NCa’s decision contains no reference 
to the State control whatsoever. at the same time, in another merger case, 
notified in the same year, the Cypriot NCa acknowledged the State own-
ership of China Shipping terminal development (Hong Kong) Co ltd, 
which was a Hong Kong-based subsidiary of China Shipping (Group) Co, 
another SoE controlled by the central SaSaC.68 
in Slovakia, the anti-Monopoly office assessed a concentration 
involving Zhengzhou Coal Mining Machinery Group, a listed SoE with 
66 Commission for the Protection of Competition (Cyprus), decision No. 16/2013 of 4 March 2013.
67 http://wwwen.cmhk.com/main/a/2016/a26/a30448_30530.shtml. 
68 Commission for the Protection of Competition (Cyprus), decision No. 66/2013 of 21 october 
2013.
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substantial shareholding controlled by the regional SaSaC of Henan 
province. although State ownership was acknowledged, no further con-
sideration of this fact was included in the decision.69 in 2013, the danish 
Competition and Consumer authority analysed the joint venture of China 
Shipping terminal development (Hong Kong) (CStd) and Shanghai 
international Port Group (SiPG) for the operation of a port terminal 
located in Zeebrugge (Belgium). SiPG was a regional SoE controlled by 
the Shanghai government, while CStd was controlled by China Shipping 
Group, an SoE under the administration of the central SaSaC. The 
merger was cleared under simplified procedure and the decision contains 
no mention of the State ownership in the acquiring undertakings.70 The 
same transaction has been cleared by the romanian Competition Council 
without any assessment of the State control.71 Similarly, when the Czech 
office for Protection of Competition examined the acquisition of linde 
Hydraulics GmbH, a German manufacturer of hydraulic pumps, motors 
and valves by Weichai Power Co, the NCa considered Shandong Heavy 
industry Group as the ultimate controlling entity without addressing 
the fact that the latter was under control of the regional SaSaC of the 
Shandong province.72 The Bulgarian NCa cleared the acquisition of the 
Serbian steel manufacturer Zelezara Smederevo d.o.o. by He Steel Group 
Co ltd, a Chinese SoE controlled by the regional SaSaC of the Hebei 
province without any assessment of the State control.73
The merger control practice of the italian competition authority 
L’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (aGCM) demon-
strates a far more detailed consideration of the State ownership in the 
domestic companies rather than in foreign ones, such as those involving 
Chinese SoEs. For example, in 2012 the aGCM issued a conditional clear-
ance decision in a merger involving two italian SoEs under control of the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF): Cassa depositi e Prestiti (CdP) 
69 anti-Monopoly office (Slovakia), decision No. 725/2017/oK-2017/FK/3/1/019 of 16 June 2017.
70 Press release BitE-13/10659-20 of 16 october 2013, https://www.kfst.dk/afgoerelser-rul-
ing/konkurrenceomraadet/afgoerelser/2013/20131016-godkendelse-paa-baggrund-af-en-
forenklet-sagsbehandling-af-apm-terminals-bv/. 
71 romanian Competition Council, decision No. 45 of 2 december 2013.
72 office for Protection of Competition (Czech republic), decision No. ÚoHS-S647/2012/
KS-22387/2012/840/lBř of 27 November 2012.
73 Commission for Protection of Competition (Bulgaria), decision No. 461 of 15 June 2016 in case 
210/2016.
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and Snam, a subsidiary of the incumbent energy giant Eni.74 Following the 
approach articulated in the EU Commission’s Jurisdictional Notice, the 
aGCM concluded that the merging parties’ pre-merger constituted two 
different economic entities with independent decisional powers. While 
MEF was exercising direct influence on the major corporate decisions of 
CdP by holding a 70% stake in its capital, Snam was controlled only indi-
rectly by being a subsidiary of Eni where MEF exercised its voting rights 
only to pursue public interest objectives. Concerned with the existence of 
structural links in the form of minority shareholdings, which could facili-
tate collusion, the aGCM has ordered a number of remedies to address 
anti-competitive concerns.75 
When assessing one of the largest Chinese investments in Europe in 2011, 
the acquisition of Hungarian BorsodChem by Wanhua industrial Group, 
the world’s leading producer of isocyanate, the aGCM merely noted that 
the acquiring party is controlled by the People’s republic of China.76 in 
2012, the italian NCa examined an acquisition of control over Ferretti 
S.p.a. by Weichai Holding Group Hong Kong investment Co.77 The rel-
evant product market covered design, construction and marketing of large 
luxury boats. The acquiring undertaking was part of Weichai Holding 
Group Co., a Hong Kong-based holding, wholly owned by Shadong Heavy 
industry Group. The latter is an SoE under the supervision of the regional 
SaSaC of Shandong province. in its competitive assessment of the notified 
concentration the aGCM considered the operations of other undertakings 
under control of the Shandong SaSaC. in the case78 concerning the acqui-
sition of ingram Micro inc. by tianjin tianhai investment Company, the 
aGCM did not consider the fact that the acquirer’s major shareholder is 
HNa Group, a large Chinese conglomerate active within a number of 
markets worldwide.79 
74 aGCM, decision No. 23824 of 8 august 2012 in case C11695.
75 See Michele Giannino, “The italian Competition authority exerts its jurisdiction on a concen-
tration between two firms owned by the State and conditionally clears it” (CDP/Snam), e-Competi-
tions Bulletin august 2012, art. no. 49218. 
76 aGCM, decision No. 21893 of 9 december 2010 in case C10820.
77 aGCM, decision No. 23379 of 6 March 2012 in case C11502.
78 aGCM, decision No. 26152 of 4 august 2016 in case C12064.
79 See e.g. Mike Gee, “What do we know about tianjin tianhai, the company buying ingram 
Micro?”, 18 February 2016, https://www.arnnet.com.au/article/594196/what-do-we-know-about-
tianjin-tianhai-company-buying-ingram-micro/. When the same transaction was notified in 
Slovakia, the anti-Monopoly office acknowledged the HNa Group’s shareholding in its clearance 
decision. See decision No. 2016/FK/3/1/040 of 5 august 2016. The same transaction was cleared 
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The Hungarian NCa (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal) also followed the 
approach formulated in the Jurisdictional Notice in relation to the eco-
nomic independence of SoEs. in 2012, it examined an acquisition 
involving two Hungarian SoEs controlled by the Minister for National 
development.80 one of the undertakings was controlled through a limited 
company owned by the Hungarian State, which is bound by the decisions 
of the Minister, who is also empowered to adopt and amend its bylaws 
and appoint the members of the board.  another SoE was a financial 
institution, which is also controlled by the Minister. However, its bylaws 
expressly stipulated that the Minister was not entitled to make decisions 
concerning the business plan or other decisions that are within the com-
petence of the board.81 The Hungarian NCa concluded that the two SoEs 
were controlled by distinct entities and, therefore, their merger constituted 
an economic concentration for the purposes of the Competition act.
The situation would be no different if one would survey merger control 
practices of other European jurisdictions. For example, the Macedonian 
Commission for Protection of Competition has screened the acquisition of 
the Serbian steel manufacturing conglomerate Zelezara Smederevo d.o.o. 
by Hesteel Group, a Chinese SoE, controlled by the SaSaC of the Hebei 
province.82 The NCa’s decision contains no mention of State ownership in 
the acquiring undertaking. When the same company acquired control over 
luxembourg-based duferco international trading Holding, involved in 
the distribution of steel products, the Macedonian NCa did not acknowl-
edge the State ownership either.83 Finally, when examining the CNAC/
Syngenta merger, the Macedonian NCa only considered the immediate 
parent company of CNaC – ChemChina, without acknowledging that 
ChemChina is an SoE under the control of the central SaSaC.84 When 
calculating the turnover of the parties, the NCa included the turnover of 
by the Spanish NCa. The respective press release does not contain any discussion on the acknowl-
edged State ownership of the acquiring party. See decision C/0858/17 ZMJ/CrCi/NEGoCio SG 
of 29 June 2017, https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/1787767_1.pdf. 
80 Hungarian Competition authority, decision in case Vj-23/2012 of 22 March 2012.
81 See Zsuzsanna Németh, “The Hungarian Competition office clears the acquisition of the pro-
spective owner and operator of the gas interconnector between Slovakia and Hungary by two state 
owned companies (Magyar Villamos Művek / MFB invest Befektetési és Vagyonkezelő / Magyar 
Gáz tranzit)”, e-Competitions Bulletin 2012, art. no. 49212.
82 Commission for Protection of Competition (Macedonia), decision No. 08-30 of 24 June 2016.
83 Commission for Protection of Competition (Macedonia), decision No. 08-25 of 2 april 2015.
84 Commission for Protection of Competition (Macedonia), decision No. 08-39 of 5 august 2016.
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ChemChina without considering the question of whether the turnover of 
other Chinese SoEs in the same sector should be included.
in Serbia, the Commission for Protection of Competition assessed the 
acquisition of Pirelli by CNaC. in its assessment, the NCa noted that 
CNaC’s parent company, ChemChina, is an SoE. despite the fact that the 
notifying party submitted voluminous data concerning the corporate gov-
ernance of ChemChina, the Serbian NCa considered that such informa-
tion was irrelevant to the competitive assessment of the notified concen-
tration.85 When ChemChina notified its acquisition of German equipment 
manufacturer Kraus Maffei Group GmbH, the Serbian NCa acknowl-
edged the State ownership and control exercised by the central SaSaC, 
but did not consider this issue in the competitive assessment of the merg-
er.86 The screening of the CNAC/Syngenta merger in Serbia also did not 
address the issues related to State ownership and control over CNaC and 
ChemChina.87 Finally, Hesteel’s acquisition of Serbian steel manufacturer 
Zelezara Smederevo d.o.o., which represented a politically significant for-
eign investment for that country, was cleared through a simplified proce-
dure by the Serbian NCa the day after the approval of the CNAC/Syngenta 
transaction by the EU Commission. The competition authority did not 
attribute any significance to the fact that Hesteel Group is a Chinese SoE, 
controlled by the SaSaC of the Hebei province.88
The above review of the merger control practice of the NCas in the EU 
Member States and other European jurisdictions demonstrates that the 
issues of State ownership and control receive even less attention than in 
the cases examined by the EU Commission. in the majority of the national 
merger decisions, the NCas have barely acknowledged the State owner-
ship of the SoEs and have provided no justification when defining the 
scope of the “single economic unit”, which was sometimes limited to the 
group of companies controlled by the regional SaSaCs or to the SoE par-
ent of the merging parties. While many of the NCas have previous expe-
rience in assessing the mergers of domestic SoEs, their merger decisions 
85 Commission for Protection of Competition (Serbia), decision No. 6/0-02-385/2015-7 of 12 June 
2015.
86 Commission for Protection of Competition (Serbia), decision No. 6/0-02-120/2016-6 of 12 
February 2016.
87 Commission for Protection of Competition (Serbia), decision No. 6/0-02-202/2016-13 of 23 May 
2016.
88 Commission for Protection of Competition (Serbia), decision No. 6/0-02-372/2016-10 of 24 May 
2016.
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concerning Chinese SoEs displays limited understanding of China’s SoE 
governance rules and institutions. 
Concluding remarks 
The following issues remain largely unresolved both in the EU and 
national merger control practice in relation to the concentrations involv-
ing Chinese SoEs: (1) determination of whether mergers between Chinese 
SoEs should be notified as concentrations; (2) calculation of the relevant 
turnover for the purpose of establishing the EU or national merger con-
trol jurisdiction; (3) substantive assessment of the notified concentration’s 
likely impact on competition. The first issue has not been considered by 
either the EU Commission or the NCas. The second question has mainly 
been left unanswered since the annual turnover of a single Chinese SoE 
was sufficient to establish the existence of the “Community dimension”, 
while at the national level the NCas have considered the turnover of the 
SoEs controlled by the regional SaSaCs on a case-by-case basis. The third 
issue has been addressed by the EU Commission using a “worst case” sce-
nario approach, while at the national level the substantive assessment is 
largely absent from the published clearance decisions. as has been noted 
by antitrust scholars, the determination of the “single economic unit” for 
the Chinese SoEs will have significant impact not only on future merger 
cases, but also on the enforcement of the EU competition rules (articles 
101 and 102 tFEU) against the potential anti-competitive conduct of these 
companies.89
The continuous application of the “worst case” scenario approach by the 
EU Commission has provided little guidance to the NCas as to how to 
address the issues of State ownership and State control of Chinese SoEs 
in their domestic merger control practice. as the review of the national 
merger control rules and guidelines demonstrates, few Member States 
have explicitly addressed the assessment of SoE-related concentra-
tions and most frequently the reference is made to the EU Commission’s 
Jurisdictional Notice. When it comes to their practical application, the 
review of NCas’ decisions regarding the clearance of mergers involv-
ing Chinese SoEs demonstrates that for the most part the competition 
authorities pay little regard to the issue of State control and often disregard 
89 See angela Huyue Zhang, “The single-entity theory: an antitrust time bomb for Chinese State-
owned enterprises?”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 8, no. 4 (2012): 805-830.
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it altogether. Unfortunately, the divergence in procedural rules governing 
national merger control mechanisms leads to the situation when certain 
NCas are not required to substantiate the results of their assessment in 
case of merger clearances. as a result, it is often impossible to compre-
hend whether and to what extent a particular NCa has taken into account 
the issue of State control and how it has affected the results of the merger 
assessment.
The apparent discontent between the EU Commission and the NCas in 
terms of their assessment of the Chinese SoEs’ acquisitions under merger 
control rules could potentially lead to the more frequent use of other forms 
of foreign investment screening, such as a national security review or sec-
tor-specific merger control provisions. The EU Commission has already 
made a decisive step in that direction by submitting a proposal for a regu-
lation, establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct invest-
ments into the European Union,90 which has been acclaimed by Germany, 
France and italy “as an important step towards a level playing field in 
Europe”.91 This move is likely to reinvigorate the existing Fdi screening 
mechanisms92 and lead to the establishment of new ones, which would 
shift the attention from the competitive assessment of the SoE-related 
concentrations to the consideration of other public policy objectives.
90 EU Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union, 
CoM (2017) 487 final, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/CoM-2017-487-
F1-EN-MaiN-Part-1.PdF. See also Erica Wiking Hager and Carolina dacko, “EU Fdi screening 
– legal considerations”, Mannheimer Swartling, June 2017, https://www.mannheimerswartling.se/
globalassets/publikationer/msa_nyhetsbrev_eu_fdi_mechanism_a4_final.pdf. 
91 Joint press release by Germany, France italy “EU proposal on investment vetting is an important 
step towards level playing field in Europe and better protection in case of corporate acquisitions”, 
13 September 2017, https://www.bmwi.de/redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/20170913-eu-
vorschlag-zu-investitionspruefungen-wichtiger-schritt-fuer-faire-wettbewerbsbedingungen-in-
europa-und-besseren-schutz-bei-firmenuebernahmen.html. 
92 Currently, the following Member States have screening mechanisms in place: austria, denmark, 
Germany, Finland, France, latvia, lithuania, italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. For an overview of the national Fdi screening mechanisms see Gisela Grieger, “Foreign 
direct investment screening: a debate in light of China-EU Fdi flows”, European Parliamentary 
research Service, May 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/BriE/2017/603941/
EPrS_Bri(2017)603941_EN.pdf.  
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